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Abstract 
Insurance and Financial Products to Mitigate Political and Credit Risk 
Peter Dev Marton, MBA;MGPS 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
Supervisors: William Inboden, and James Galbraith 
This project explores insurance and financial products corporations use to transfer 
political and credit risk. In the post-WWII era, government agencies created new types of 
political risk and credit insurances to foster investments abroad. This market developed 
with greater participation from the private sector beginning in the 1990s. Concurrently, 
credit derivatives including credit default swaps (CDS) began, which worked similarly as 
hedges against default risk. This report develops a comparison of these two instruments, 
from their initial inception to their current regulation. From a policy perspective, the 
contrast between insurances and CDS illuminates some of the challenges the public 
sector faces when, in turn, working to foster foreign business activity and regulate the 
broader financial system.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The way corporations reduce the business risk associated with foreign activity has 
changed considerably over the past forty years. Through help from the public-sector 
(chiefly with the aid of the Export-Import Bank (“Eximbank”) and the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC)), from the post-WWII period onwards corporations 
found ways to insure products and financing. As these insurance markets developed, 
private-sector companies such as American International Group (AIG), Zurich Insurance 
Group (“Zurich”), and Ace Limited, increasingly came online to supplant these 
government offerings for political and credit risks ranging from outright nationalizations 
of assets to sovereign and foreign corporate defaults. Additionally in the 1990s, financial 
companies, created financial innovations such as credit default swaps (CDS) that 
competed with these insurance products as a means to hedge against default risk largely 
without public-sector interference or regulation. To the extent oversight existed with 
these credit derivatives products, it may have misaligned market incentives. The AAA-
credit rating a CDS imbued, part of the securitization process of packages such as 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), were 
granted through credit-ratings agencies who earned commissions based on clients 
receiving high ratings.  These developments raise serious questions about the current role 
of public agencies such as Eximbank and OPIC on the insurance front, and in turn the 
role the public sector plays to track financial innovations and ensure stability in the 
financial system. 
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 To understand better the credit and political risk markets currently, I structure the 
paper as follows. First, I describe what constitutes political risk and credit insurance and 
trace its history since Congress first authorized the Export-Import Bank in 1948. With 
this insurance background, I offer a parallel explanation of credit default swaps and the 
development and growth of derivatives that led to their creation and widespread use. A 
recounting of the development of these tools reveals how at least one type of insurance, 
Non-Payment Insurance, which serves as a financial guarantee across credit events, and 
the capital-market based CDS compete to hedge against default risk. I conclude by 
suggesting possible trends in risk management within the context of changes in insurance 
and financial markets. Specifically, the insurance market sees the private sector adopting 
the policies originally within a public agency’s mandate, and an increasing number of 
actors who offer coverage over a growing range of political and credit risks. In turn, the 
public sector arrived to the show quite late to regulate derivatives. Only recently through 
Dodd-Frank have policymakers worked to bring comprehensive oversight to these 
financial products, with the jury still out on current reforms. Finally, I explore how, while 
a political risk “derivative” does not yet exist, I trace how such a liquid market may 
develop as an alternative or supplement to current political risk insurance contracts. 
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II. MARKET PRICING OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
Before delving into political and credit risk, it is instructive to define risk broadly. 
From a financing perspective, risk describes the likelihood an investment’s return is 
different than expected. Risk management is the process to identify, analyze, and either 
accept or mitigate such variability in investment and business decision-making.1 The 
“market price” for a given risk describes the equilibrium price that markets will bear for a 
certain outcome. For certain risks, actuarial science employs sophisticated modeling 
based on past information to create a point-estimate, or specific dollar value, to value the 
premium for insurance coverage. Examples abound; for example, through the aggregation 
of accidents that occur throughout the United States, an auto insurance provider can 
collect data specific to the insured such as car type, credit history, age, and other risk 
factors, and tabulate how much would be actuarially “fair,” after recouping costs, for a 
user to pay for insurance.  
At the same time, there are types of insurance where conditions simply do not 
allow for actuarial pricing. For example, without a rich data set specific to a company’s 
business profile, one cannot identify the credit risk that firm has of a default, or a firm 
with foreign facilities of suffering from a government expropriation.  The unique nature 
of these low-risk, but high-severity events prevents the tabulation of an actuarial value.2 
                                                 
1 Skipper & Kwan. Page 6.  
2 One of the first to recognize this distinction was Frank Knight in his 1927 dissertation Risk, Uncertainty 
and Profit. Knight notes three types of uncertainty.  “A priori probabilities” follow certain logic (for 
example, the probability of a dice roll). Statistical probability describes where empirically “the proportions 
found in the past will hold in the future.” Estimates, in turn have “no valid basis for classifying” a 
likelihood. What makes the challenge of political risk so great then, is that these political hazards fall at 
best within the realm of statistical probability.  
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Through the Law of Large Numbers, a corporation diversifies the damage a single claim 
causes, which allows for it to pool these potential damages. Similarly for a political risk 
or credit insurer, rather than have exposure to only one company, these commercial 
underwriters have exposure across multiple industry types, political perils, and locations. 
Active monitoring of exposures to any one of these criteria allows insurers to gain profits 
through the collecting of premiums from insured companies, while companies in turn can 
offset such catastrophic events. 
Risk managers use a range of qualitative and quantitative approaches to help 
identify and measure exposure. Political risk forecasting has grown as a cottage industry, 
with more than twenty boutique-consulting firms concentrated in New York, Washington 
D.C., and London alone offering to help analyze a country’s exposure.3 Other advisory 
services including insurance brokers increasingly offer such guidance as part of their risk 
management solutions.4 Scenario planning, popularized by the Rand Corporation and 
Royal Dutch Shell, offers another means to structure systematically the probability of 
future outcomes that might impact a firm.5 More quantitative approaches try to 
operationalize the values of different risks through weighted indices. The tools they use 
range from proprietary, weighted indices based on longitudinal studies that employ a 
                                                 
3 For an updated list of such firms, please to refer to my http://politicalriskbroker.com/ weblog.  
4 For example, the geopolitical advisory firm PRS Group publishes an “International Country Risk Guide” 
that offers weighted indices for twelve indicators.  However, because these values exist only at the country-
level and are industry-agnostic, some question the usefulness or validity of such forecasting.  A number of 
insurance providers also publish risk metrics, including the export credit agency ONDD (here), which 
breaks down political risk across dimensions such as expropriation or transfer risk.  
5 Chermack, Thomas J. “Improving Decision-Making with Scenario Planning.” Futures (April 2004). 
Available here.  
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series of different predictive variables to more subjective, qualitative assessments based 
on various social and political drivers.  
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) provide another tool to analyze risk through the 
collection and analysis of data to rate the creditworthiness of state and corporate actors.  
These credit ratings agencies have a long history within the United States to overcome 
information asymmetry between investors and debt issuers. Three major actors (Standard 
& Poor, Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings) have an oligopoly in the dissemination of these 
materials, controlling 94% of the global market.6 While credit ratings agencies create 
transparency of different risk profiles, a review of CRAs’ history reveals these three 
companies pivoted towards a commissions-based model that valued high ratings (rather 
than just a subscription package) in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis. As a result, 
incentives became institutionalized where CRAs were reluctant assign poor grades to 
increasingly risky issuances, and therefore, created a false sense of stability in risky 
holdings.  
Thus, there is a limited data set available to risk managers with respect to political 
risk, and to a less extent credit risk. However, through capital and insurance markets, 
corporations can take specific actions to transfer such adverse outcomes directly to third 
parties. In the next section, I identify how corporations identify specific political and 
credit risks.   
                                                 
6 Petit, Nicholas. “Credit Ratings Agencies, the Sovereign Debt Crisis and Competition Law.” European 
Competition Journal (December 2011). Page 589. Available here.  
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III. POLITICAL RISK & STRUCTURED CREDIT INSURANCE 
A) Definition 
 While there is no settled definition of political risk, the literature identifies 
political risk as any action from a state actor that can affect a corporation’s profitability. 
For example, Skipper and Kwan’s International Risk identifies political risk as “Any 
governmental action that diminishes the value of a firm operating within the political 
boundaries or influence of the government.”7 Some frame political risk more broadly; for 
example, Ian Bremmer, the CEO of one of the leading geopolitical risk consultancies, 
defines political risk as “The probability that a particular political action will presumably 
produce changes in economic outcomes.”8 Changes include not just a state’s actions but 
also stem from non-state sources such as protestors or terrorists, who might affect a 
business’s operations. “Sovereign” risk similarly describes direct government 
interventions in business outcomes as well as other political, economic, and local 
impacts.9 For purposes of this research, political risk includes one-time events such as 
expropriations and more prolonged situations such as social unrest and currency 
inconvertibility. 
Corporations can hedge against these political events that could lead to claims 
through political risk insurance (PRI) policies. In exchange for annual premiums 
                                                 
7 W. Jean Kwon and Harold D. Skipper. Risk Management and Insurance: Perspectives in a Global 
Economy. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing; Malden, MA (2009).  Page 431.  
8 Bremmer, Ian. The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford 
University Press (2010).  
9 Kesternich, Iris and Monika Schnitzer. “Who Is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and Their 
Choice of Capital Structure.” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 (Nov. 2010> Available 
here.  
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throughout the life of a project or for a pre-determined number of years, a company can 
have an insurer cover against the cost should certain catastrophic events occur. Typically 
through an insurance broker, the company specifies “Terms and Conditions” written into 
a bespoke contract, whose range is some percentage of the book value of the investments 
depending on the sources of risk, and types of coverage provided (listed below). As well 
as asset protection, these insurers also transfer default risk of a sovereign or corporation’s 
debt, and other different contractual issues through such annual premiums. Below I 
provide the types of coverage that AIG’s “Political Risk and Structured Credit” specialty 
insurance line, the largest underwriter in the United States, currently provides.10 
  
                                                 
10 AIG. Types of Political Risk Coverage.  http://www.aig.com/political-risk_3171_418000.html 
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B) Types of Political Risk & Structured Credit Coverage 
I) CONFISCATION, EXPROPRIATION, AND NATIONALIZATION 
The most basic type of political risk insurance coverage is “Confiscation, 
Expropriation, and Nationalization (CEN).” These three terms refer to different ways that 
a government may take control of a foreign company’s assets. Confiscation typically 
does not include repayment, expropriation seizes assets based explicitly from the national 
interest, and nationalization describes direct incorporation of a foreign entity into public 
ownership.11 CEN played a leading role in concerns about political risk as a result of 
foreign governments expropriating corporate assets of more than one hundred companies 
between 1956 and 1971, primarily in the mining and oil and gas industries.12 Since, most 
countries have adopted bilateral investment treaties with the United States, where 
governments agree to not expropriate property, and to submit to arbitration should such 
an event arise. Such terms generally reduced the likelihood of CEN events globally.13 
CEN policies served an important role to help insure companies against the potentially 
catastrophic losses that a government seizure would cause, particularly during the Cold 
War, when volatility in politically unstable regions may have otherwise reduced 
companies’ desires to invest abroad.  
II) POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
Political Violence (PV) accounts for physical damage to assets, and can extend as 
well to business interruption as a result of social unrest, and “forced abandonment” of a 
foreign enterprise if the home government requires evacuation of personnel due to 
danger. Companies work out detail of coverage in the inception of a policy, but a typical 
                                                 
11 Fitzpatrick, William and Samuel DiLullo. “Seizure: Government and Nationalization of Corporate 
Assets.” Competition Forum (2009). Available here. Page 548. 
12 Fitzpatrick et al. Page 548.  
13 Choi et al. Page 132.  
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PV policy includes protests and war. What this policy covers ranges as certain insurers 
for example have become less willing to provide terrorism insurance and put specific 
constraints on what constitutes war. Additionally, instability such as in Ukraine following 
the spring of 2014, causes insurers to greatly increased premiums, not insure such 
regions, or impose additional sub-limits that lower the amount a company can transfer to 
insurers. Similar uncertainty in the Middle East from the Arab Spring (where, for 
example, terrorism coverage costs 400 to 500 percent more than it did prior to the 
outbreak of protests) highlights how risk managers must actively apply for such risk 
coverage rather than wait until circumstances deteriorate.14  
III) CURRENCY INCONVERTIBILITY AND CONTRACT FRUSTRATION 
Inability to convert profits into the home country’s currency (inconvertibility) and 
contractual challenges have become more immediately concerning to risk managers. 
Currency inconvertibility refers to a situation where a company is unable to repatriate 
from a host country for a variety of reasons, including adverse regulatory conditions. 
Contract Frustration in turn refers to a cancellation of a contract by a buyer, which could 
include governments, government-sponsored agencies, due to political reasons such as 
selective enforcements of laws. A series of financial crises (including the sovereign debt 
defaults in Latin American markets of the 1980s and early 1990s, capital controls in 
Argentina in the early 2000’s and claims related to the 2008 financial crisis), expanded 
                                                 
14 Clark, Patrick. “Political Violence: How Insurers Measure the Risk.” Bloomberg (9/1/11). Available 
here.  
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greatly the salience of this kind of protection especially in countries with weaker legal 
institutions where arbitration is harder to achieve.1516  
IV) SOVEREIGN PAYMENT DEFAULT 
Sovereign payment default describes where a government defaults on its bond 
payments. From a financing perspective, governments go increasingly to capital markets 
through bond issuances, which increases the potential for direct sovereign risk for 
counterparties who purchase such bonds. This emerging market debt—and the attendant 
insurance that mitigate such exposure for banks— illustrates how political risk insurance 
covers increasingly complex risks for a wider range of participants (in this case, typically 
banks that hold sovereign debt).  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
15 Simon, Jeffrey D. “Political Risk Forecasting.” Futures (1985), 17(2), 132-148. Available here.  
16 Recently, insurers have added an additional layer of insurance, “Arbitration Award Default” coverage, 
where should companies win in a recognized arbitration court and the host country continues to refuses to 
pay, then the insurer would cover this contingency.  
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Exhibit 1: Emerging Markets Debt Trading Volume17 
 
Indeed, that sovereign debt increased to some $34 trillion by 2009 shows how there debt 
issuers have high exposure to sovereign debt risk.18 On a more contractual basis, 
coverage also exists for a “Non-Honoring of a Sovereign Obligation.” In such a claim, a 
state or one of its enterprises may renege on its payments of a long-term contract (beyond 
just bond issuances). 
V) NON-PAYMENT INSURANCE  
Non-Payment Insurance (NPI) offers a more general contract that protects against 
financial default of an obligor (or debtor) whether for commercial or political reasons. 
Also referred to in industry as “financial guarantee” insurance, in contrast to a 
corporation’s assets, NPI serves as a cover for a bank seeking to transfer credit risk. One 
leading broker describes advantages of this type of transfer strategy as an “uncorrelated 
                                                 
17 Prasetyo, Yoal & Maniranjan Kumar. “The Investment Case for Emerging Market Debt.” Russell 
Research (April 2012). Available here.  
18 Calculated Risk. “How Large is the Outstanding Value of Sovereign Bonds.” (2010). Available here.  
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and non-systemic alternative to the secondary market…increasingly used by [financial 
institutions] as an offensive instrument to increase market share at the expense of 
competitors.”19 While a more complete discussion of NPI will take place later in this 
paper, in short, these attributes describe NPI’s ability to create liquidity and provide 
capital relief tailored to a specific credit risk.  
  
                                                 
19 Marsh Lenders Solutions Group. “Non-Payment Insurance” (2013).  
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C) History of Political Risk and Credit Insurance 
The issue of political and credit risk came to the forefront in the post-WWII 
period as US corporations increasingly sought ways to insure their assets against 
expropriations and confiscation by foreign governments. Previously, companies either 
did not invest in volatile regions or recognized this danger as the cost of doing business. 
In particular, expropriations by regimes across Latin America and OPEC countries 
highlighted the dangers of operating abroad. In the United States credit insurance, 
wherein a company transfers the risk of the purchaser of their assets going delinquent on 
their loans to a third party, similarly began after World War II.  
I) GROWTH OF PUBLIC-SECTOR INSURANCE PROGRAMS 
Through the Marshall Plan and the creation of the U.S.  Export-Import Bank 
(Eximbank), corporations could work with the U.S. government to help foreign buyers 
receive direct financing, and have their own streams of revenue insured. In the post-
WWII period, fear of non-payment by foreign buyers was growing. Companies exported 
to riskier areas where purchasers did not have great credit. As one academic describes: 
the seller was “justifiably concerned about sending goods beyond his national borders to 
buyers of unknown financial reputation, where legal remedies to force payment, if 
necessary, may be either unavailable or too expensive to pursue.”20  For investors, 
serving a market via exports-only was the lowest-risk strategy for foreign entry. Because 
exports did not involve a transfer of capital or equity, a company could minimize 
                                                 
20 Greene, Mark R. “Export Credit Insurance. Its Role in Expanding World Trade.” The Journal of Risk 
and Insurance (June 1965). Available here.  
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potential losses to the actual flows of goods and services to the foreign country. Though 
this strategy reduced risk, it also limited the potential upside of presence within a market 
since serving a market via export might not be competitive with local production. The 
Eximbank therefore helped create incentives for foreign market entry to become 
economically feasible at a time when few would-be buyers stood ready to purchase 
American goods and services. 
In the 1960s, as American corporations began to not only export goods to 
politically volatile areas but also increasingly locate facilities at these sites and invest in 
direct equity stakes, the U.S. government began to intercede further to support such 
business activity. Since foreign direct investment (FDI) by nature is long-term capital, not 
easily liquidated in a short period, such investments were inherently more risky than 
moving goods abroad. Specifically, joint ventures with a foreign corporation or 
government with a revenue-sharing agreement or wholly-owned subsidiaries offered 
deeper investment into a country’s economy. The literature identifies a number of key 
factors that continue to drive such flows: regime type, openness of the country, size of 
market, labor productivity, and political stability.21 Local conditions such as capital 
controls that limit the repatriation of funds, prohibitions against ownership of more tha 
50% in certain “strategic” sectors, or have other constraints for foreign operators put a 
                                                 
21 Gour Goswami and Samai Haider. “Does Political Risk Deter FDI Inflows? An Analytical Approach 
Using Panel Data and Factor Analysis.” Journal of Economic Studies (2014) 41:2 , 233-252. Available 
here.    
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limit to such activity. 22 However, the increase beyond exports significantly enhanced the 
role of these new insurance measures  
In addition to the Eximbank, export credit insurance was also popularized through 
the joint public-private Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FCIA). The FCIA formed 
in 1961 to “insure U.S. exporting companies against unforeseen defaults by foreign 
buyers and … import restrictions in foreign countries.”23 By the end of the 1960s, an 
American company could not only insure its products against foreign loss, but 
increasingly could have foreign debt exposures transferred to a combination of private 
insurers and the Eximbank. While the United States was one of the first to market such 
export credit insurance, countries all over the world developed their own export credit 
agencies, and several now dwarf the Eximbank’s balance sheet.24 Alongside export and 
credit insurance, political risk insurance created further incentives for FDI, and a more 
accommodating environment for American corporations.  
Alongside the FCIA, political risk insurance appeared amidst Congressional 
disillusionment about the status quo surrounding foreign aid projects, and private 
corporations’ desires to expand abroad. In 1969, the creation of a development finance 
agency, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), introduced a market-driven 
approach to help meet the United States’ development cooperation policies. These 
                                                 
22 Jensen, Nathan. “Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment.” Journal of 
Politics,. Vol. 70, No. 4, October 2008, pages 1040-1052. Available through UT Library here. 
23 Funatsu, Hideki. “Export Credit Insurance.” Journal of Risk and Insurance (53, 4 (Dec. 1986). Available 
here.  
24 Indeed, some 100 national export credit agencies exist worldwide, and the US ranks only fourth in size 
behind China, Japan, and Germany.  
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measures included directives to help alleviate poverty and create conditions to enable 
self-sustaining growth abroad.25  The statutory basis for this agency was the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, which called for an agency to “mobilize and facilitate the 
participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic and social 
development of less developed countries and areas, and countries in transition from 
nonmarket to market activities.”26 Such an entity set the foundation for political risk 
insurance, and furthered corporate participation in efforts to reduce poverty abroad.  
At the outset, OPIC worked principally against three events a corporation might 
face: 
1) “The inability to convert, into dollars, the local currency received by the 
investor as profits, or earnings, or return of the original investment; 
2) The loss of investment due to expropriation, nationalization, or confiscation 
by action of a foreign government; and  
3) Loss due to war, revolution, or insurrection”27  
Such insurance policies offered American companies an effective guarantee should there 
be political events, in exchange for a premium based on the perceived riskiness of a 
project (typically about 1.5% of the investment).28 At the time, President Nixon argued 
that OPIC would bring “businesslike management of investment incentives” to 
developing nations. From its inception, OPIC created a means to price political risk, 
incentivizing corporations to contribute to growth in low-income countries through direct 
                                                 
25 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L 87-195), Sec. 101. Page 16. Available here.  
26 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L 87-195), Sec. 101. Page 122. Available here. 
27 U.S. Government Accounting Office. “The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Its Role in 
Development” (February 27, 1981). Available from http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/134151.pdf. 
28 An important caveat, however: this value was not market-driven as OPIC did not compete with private 
actors for decades, which suggest an implicit government subsidy to effect such a foreign policy and 
business promotion agenda.  
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investment.29 Because OPIC’s deals worked over longer-term, project-based finance, it 
also helped to sustain a deeper relationship between American corporations and their 
foreign partners.    
 Qualifications for OPIC-insured projects stipulated certain criteria tied to poverty 
reduction, and projects that helped drive economic growth (to fulfill its mandate in 
development finance), but these provisions became more flexible over time. At first, 
resource extraction of metals and oil and gas were typically prohibited, as certain 
policymakers argued these industries did little to relieve poverty.30  These conditions 
gave way to a growing sense that emerging markets could help the United States secure 
resources of strategic value. For example, in 1979 the United States depended on Africa 
for thirteen of nineteen crucial strategic minerals.31 Even during the Carter 
Administration, despite OPIC’s original intentions, “more than 60 percent of total 
insurance and finance was allocated to he oil and gas and mining sectors.”32 After 
President Reagan came into office in 1981, these shifts in OPIC’s priorities became more 
pronounced, removing its emphasis on low per-capita-income states, thereby 
“undermining the focus on lesser-developed countries.”33 Limits on projects, to the extent 
there were any, were achieved through lobbying by environmental and union interests.   
                                                 
29 Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard Nixon. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969. P. 
412. From The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Background and Legislative Issues (2012), here.  
30 Plucket, Blake. “The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, OPIC, and the Retreat from Transparency.” 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (Volume 15, Issue 1). Available from 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1369&context=ijgls. 
31 Hendrickson, Roshen. “Adjustments in the Role of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(OPIC) in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Africa Today, Volume 58, No. 4, Summer 2012. 
32 Hendrickson (2012). 
33 Hendrickson (2012).  
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During the Clinton Administration, a further rhetorical shift occurred “aid-oriented 
approach to a focus on trade.”34  Throughout the 1980’s and 1990s, political risk 
insurance became less directed at its original mission, so long as policies operated in 
high-risk regions.  
Over this same period, the World Bank complemented OPIC with the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), whose mandate was to “provide investment 
insurance and investment promotion to developing countries.”35 MIGA’s policies echoed 
coverages seen previously, with similar premiums: MIGA “prices to risk, and premium 
rates are decided on a per project basis, usually ranging between 30 and 100 basis point 
per investment (up to 150 in some cases per year).”36 In other words, the World Bank was 
similarly able to offer a backstop guarantee for foreign investors in politically volatile 
regions, expanding the role political risk insurance played to a greater swatch of 
corporations around the world. 
II) TRANSITION TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR  
While OPIC and MIGA popularized this insurance and earned profits consistently 
from taking in premiums, there was not an immediate transition from private-market 
insurers to adopt this business line. Congress did make efforts to promote this effort, 
Explicitly writing into its reauthorizations, for example in the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1974, a directive to begin to coordinate with 
                                                 
34 Hendrickson (2012). 
35 Jensen, Nathan. “Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment.” Journal of 
Politics,. Vol. 70, No. 4, October 2008, pages 1040-1052. Available through UT Library here.  
36 Jensen (2008).  
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the private sector: “it is the intention of Congress that the Corporation achieve 
participation by private insurance companies…. of at least 12 ½ per centum, and, under 
contracts issued on and after January 1, 1979, of at least 40 per centum.” The legislation 
additionally called on OPIC to report directly to the relevant committees in the House and 
Senate where such percentages could not be achieved.37 Tellingly, the Congress had to 
repeal these specific lines in 1978 due to a lack of appetite from private insurers.38  
Where in the mid-1980’s fewer than twelve insurers offered political risk 
insurance, half of whom were part of the Lloyd’s of London syndicate, by the 1990s 
private-market insurers began to have a bigger appetite.  Significantly these private 
players – including AIG, Ace, and Zurich – all had marine insurance products, so there 
was some experience for export risk previously. Indeed, the Vice Chairman of AIG 
Political Risk in 1987 described marine insurance as the basis for private policies.39 In 
contrast to the new political risk insurance, marine insurance, which typically triggers 
payment should a merchant vessel not arrive at its destination due to events such as 
storms or enemy capture, existed since the mid-fourteenth century within the Italian city-
states.40 These private-sector insurers enacted political risk policies initially only with 
more established companies, and did not include inconvertibility or political violence. 
                                                 
37 Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1974. Available here. Page 809.  
38 Kessler, Elizabeth. “Political Risk Insurance and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation: What 
Happened to the Private Sector?” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 
13 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. (1992). Available through HeinOnline here.  
39 Paul, Douglas A. “New Developments in Private Political Risk Insurance and Trade Finance.” The 
International Lawyer (21, 3, Summer 1987). Available here.  
40 Kingston, Christopher. “Governance and Institutional Change in Marine Insurance, 1350-1850.” 
European Review of Economic History, 18 , 1 (2014). Available here.  
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Rather, they focused on the core Confiscation, Expropriation, and Nationalization (CEN) 
coverage. Thus, the transfer of such risk products from the U.S. agencies to the private 
market took time.  
While OPIC was one of the few federal agencies to consistently have profits since 
its inception, private insurers throughout the 1990s were more conservative in their 
pricing and terms. For example, a private insurer like AIG might charge 300-350 basis 
points, or up to 3.5% of the value of an investment in premiums, where at the time OPIC, 
pending certain other criteria, might quote a lower rate (though ostensibly OPIC was not 
meant to compete directly). Price leveling occurred over time, but private actors also 
contrasted by sponsoring shorter project “tenors,” or length of contract of up to three 
years, initially, and by the end of the 1990s as long as five years. In contrast, OPIC might 
insure for more than ten years and do so for companies taking on new investments with 
less of a track record.41 Because OPIC is backed by the “full faith and credit” of the 
United States, and thereby ostensibly does not need to keep the reserve requirements a 
private insurer needs to meet claims, barring prohibitions OPIC could take on riskier 
investments at lower rates.42 As a federal agency, OPIC also had the means to lean on 
host governments to make good on their bilateral investment treaties in the event of 
triggers such a nationalization in a way that private insurers could not.43 At the same 
                                                 
41 Expert Interview. Stephen Kay (Marsh USA, Head of U.S. Political Risk Practice). 2/27/2015. 
42 Kessler, Elizabeth. “Political Risk Insurance and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation: What 
Happened to the Private Sector?” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 
13 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. (1992). Available through HeinOnline here. Page 208.  
43 Kessler, Elizabeth. “Political Risk Insurance and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation: What 
Happened to the Private Sector?” New York Law School Journal of International and Comparative Law 
13 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l & Comp. L. (1992). Available through HeinOnline here. Page 212 
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time, more broadly within the insurance market, general lines such as Property/Casualty 
were becoming increasingly commoditized and seeing new competition. As such these 
new sources of revenue for private insurers were becoming increasingly palatable to the 
private sector. For many of these large private insurers, providing coverage for foreign 
investments had the added benefit of low basis risk compared to other claims events; for 
instance, a claim on a foreign mine would not correlate with other claim events that could 
tie up an insurer’s funds, helping to diversify the overall portfolio.  
This increased interest from private actors coincided with a pickup in foreign 
activity in just the same risky areas PRI policies could help support. One metric to gauge 
this uptick on a macro level is Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to emerging markets. 
MIGA does such a calculation to show the growth of FDI over time: 
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Exhibit 2: Direct Investment to Emerging Markets and Developing Economies44 
 
 
 
Clearly, Net flows to emerging markets and developing economies, where presumably 
there may be greater political risks, increased steadily, with a setback because of the 2008 
financial crisis. Such trends suggest foreign investments in more volatile regions will 
continue, though the hangover from the 2008 credit crunch may have put an upper bound 
in the short-term. As emerging-market country reforms remove restrictions on corporate 
actions and lower transaction costs, this form of international investment is likely to grow 
in popularity.45  
                                                 
44 Data from International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database, April 2015. Available 
here.   
45 Cuerv-Cazurra, Alvaro & Luis Alfonso Dau. “Structural Reform and Firm Exports.” Management 
International Review (2009). Available here.  
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III) NON-PAYMENT INSURANCE’S GROWTH 
As a corollary to this growth in political risk insurance, the years from the 1990s 
to present day also see an evolution in the credit insurance market. In the early 1990s, a 
product at the time –also called political risk insurance or “financial guarantee” insurance 
– became available directly to banks to help insure against their debt, rather than just for 
asset protection. Specifically, this product allowed companies, chiefly banks, to 
distinguish between country risk and counterparty risk of a specific debt, and then insure 
against the former with an insurer. The low returns from lower interest rates in the United 
States brought a massive increase in funds flowing to emerging markets: $1.3 trillion in 
private capital moved to the private sectors in the developing world compared to only 
$170 billion in the previous decade.46 As a result, banks purchased NPI in large volumes 
as they reached either self-imposed or government-mandated country constraints for 
lending.  
This insurance therefore served an important role to provide capital relief, where 
companies could expand their balance sheets. Through these insurance products, banks 
could circumvent certain limits and requirements rather than turn away business. For 
example, a bank could create a debt deal where they earn 300-500 basis points (bps) 
above the LIBOR rate. Through an insurance placement, they could then pay around 120 
bps to an insurer to cover against country risk and the remainder would be the cost of 
execution in addition to counterparty risk.47 While this credit insurance did allow for 
                                                 
46 Panitch, Leo and Sam Gandin. “Prelude to the Crisis: The US Treasury, Financial Markets, and ‘Failure 
Containment.’” Critical Sociology (2014). Available here. Page 782.  
47 Expert Interview. Stephen Kay (Marsh USA, Head of U.S. Political Risk Practice). 2/27/2015 
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greater debt issuance, banks assumed this insurance would provide coverage even as its 
use was largely unproven.  
The so-called “Tequila Crisis” gave rise to the first major challenge to the use of 
this tool. From the banks’ vantage, by transferring political risks such as capital control 
and currency inconvertibility, banks could make lower but safer profits. However, when 
losses began to accumulate due to large credit losses, insurers argued successfully that 
Terms & Conditions written into individual policies had exclusions for credit risk and 
natural hazard—and thus did not cover the events unfolding. The 2001 Argentina crisis 
saw similar devaluations and exchange controls excluded from policies. Circumstances 
where banks paid out premiums but found themselves uninsured left many bankers 
burned. As one broker notes, “after Argentina [NPI] didn’t take off…and demonstrated 
the weakness of the product.” At the same time, however, insurers argued that these 
banks were sophisticated players who should have taken into account how these explicit 
exclusions from contracts could have played out given actual credit events.  
IV) CURRENT INSURANCE CLIMATE 
In 2015, the private political risk insurance market is not only robust, but also 
growing steadily in size and scope, and credit insurance has seen resurgence as well. 
While exports remain a consistent source for investors to make profits abroad, there 
exists a diverse array of foreign entry. A survey of investors conducted by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD), shows how exports and 
“brownfield” (or follow-on investments) are the most popular means to invest abroad, but 
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companies are increasing their willingness to invest directly in new factories from the 
ground up (“Greenfield” investment): 
Exhibit 3: Importance of Equity and Non-Equity Modes of Entry, 2012 and 201548 
(Respondents selecting “very important” or “extremely important”) 
 
 
As well, companies in the past few years are exploring partnerships and increasing the 
degree to which they are building new facilities. This choice of which method a company 
employs will be dictated by country-level and industry-specific political and credit risks. 
For example, one study of foreign investments by affiliates of German multinationals 
shows that they hold a relatively smaller portion of equity in foreign affiliates when 
political risk is high, and consequently hold higher leverage.49 Consequently, 
                                                 
48 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. “World Investment Prospect Surveys 2013-
2015.”  New York (2013). Available here.  
49 Kesternich, Iris and Monika Schnitzer. “Who Is Afraid of Political Risk? Multinational Firms and Their 
Choice of Capital Structure.” Journal of International Economics, Vol. 82, Iss. 2 (Nov. 2010> Available 
here. 
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organizational structure can serve as the first line of defense to determine the appropriate 
mix of assets, debt, and equity to reduce risk.  
One way to disaggregate political risks from broader business risks is simply to 
ask investors about their decision-making process. The study below offers a range of 
concerns investors identify that affect FDI flows. This survey analysis demonstrates that 
while “macroeconomic stability” remains the critical factor for investors, the post-
financial crisis period sees “political risk” affecting future investments.50  
Exhibit 4: Major Constraints to Foreign Investment (In Next 3 Years) 
 
 
With increased openness as a result of globalization trends, the size of a local market is 
less deterministic for FDI, and local corruption appears relatively less significant.   After 
                                                 
50Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. World Investment Trends and Corporate Perspectives: The 
Political Risk Insurance Industry and Breach of Contract. Washington, DC: MIGA, The World Bank 
Group. Available here. 
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political risk, lack of internal financing, and qualified staff have emerged as chief 
challenges to prospective foreign investors. 
When prompted, executives show consistency in terms of the specific regulatory 
and political risk exposures they identify. 
Exhibit 5: Political Risks of Greatest Concern to Investors in Developing Countries51 
 
Although the history of political risk recalls large-scale expropriations or political 
violence as the chief business impediments, now more technical challenges (such as 
unexpected regulatory changes, breaches of contract, and “non-honoring of financial 
obligations” from governmental agencies) concern investors most. These perceptions 
show the wide range of events that fall within the purview of political and credit risks.    
                                                 
51 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. World Investment Trends and Corporate Perspectives: The 
Political Risk Insurance Industry and Breach of Contract. Washington, DC: MIGA, The World Bank 
Group (2014). Available here. Page 22 
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 Self-reported data about the actual incidences of such challenges corroborate 
these concerns. Specifically, expropriation and nationalization have affected only six 
percent of these investors, while more than one-third of respondents cite experiences 
suffering adverse regulatory challenges and breach of contract.  
Exhibit 6: % of Respondents Experiencing Financial Losses Due to the Following Risks52 
 
 
The high self-reporting of regulatory changes and breach of contracts in contrast to war 
and other more news-worthy events shows these structural shifts in the market. 
Institutional and political environment in which these companies operate clearly 
determine firm behavior and investors’ perceptions, but the specific political hazards 
have shifted. 
In addition to this growth in foreign investment, more insurers are increasingly 
coming online to boost this industry.  Put differently, PRI currently is a “soft” market, 
                                                 
52 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (2014). Page 24. 
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where premiums are decreasing due to new entrants. More insurers puts a downward 
price pressure, and also increases competition of insurers to insure longer-term coverage. 
Further, the past decades’ low interest rates has prevented insurance companies from 
making profits on the asset side of their balance sheets and low loss ratios from a lack of 
payouts created strong incentives for such new entrants.  Exhibit 8 lists the largest 
eighteen providers of political risk insurance and the maximum tenor that each offers for 
a project.53  
Exhibit 7: Maximum Lines and Tenor for Private Insurers (Summer 2014) 
 PRI Max Line ($MM) Max Tenor 
ACE 100 15 
AIG 120 15 
Atradius 100 7 
Aspen 100 15 
Axis 50 7 
Catlin 90 16 
Coface Unistrat 65 7 
Euler Hermes 100 8 
FCIA 25 7 
Garant AG 25 7 
HCC Credit 50 7 
Ironshore 40 7 
Lancashire 200 10 
LAU 20 5 
Liberty 40 7 
Sovereign 80 15 
XL 100 10 
Zurich 150 15 
 1455  
 
                                                 
53 Marsh USA. “Capacity of Lenders.” Summer 2014.  
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This data shows the large capacity in the private market. Particularly when brokers (such 
as Marsh, Aon, and Willis) can negotiate several insurers under the same policy, 
corporations are able to transfer risk for ever-greater amounts of their balance sheets at 
cheaper rates. If a broker could convince all of these underwriters to assume a specific 
company’s or company’s exposure, then there is as much as $1.455 billion dollars (the 
aggregate limits in the markets of all insurance provides) of coverage available.54  That 
the maximum tenor increases so drastically, with the Lloyd’s Syndicate Catlin offering a 
maximum tenor of sixteen years demonstrates the search for yield among insurers is now 
eclipsing the traditional shorter-term outlook. The graphic below demonstrates just how 
quickly this growth has occurred. For example, the largest participant, AIG, grown its 
own single-risk capability from around $15 MM as recently as 1994 to $120 million in 
2015, but there are also far more insurance providers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54 Marsh USA. “Capacity of Lenders.” Summer 2014.  
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Exhibit 8: Insurer’s Market Capacity History for “Single Risk” (2003-2014) 
 
With historically cheap rates, companies seeking to transfer over risk could lock in 
longer-term deals than ever before.  
As premium rates and tenors between private and public-sector actors have begun 
to equilibrate, now the restrictions from actors such as OPIC (such as environmental 
feasibility tests), and the time required to do so have become the largest differentiator 
between public and private. For example, for OPIC to begin a new placement, it is not 
atypical for it to conduct environmental and labor studies that evaluate a project’s impact, 
and may include site visits for larger projects. Because insurance policies of more than 
$50 million must go in front of OPIC’s Board of Directors, which only meets quarterly, a 
project may sit in limbo for more than a year. In contrast, when asked about the shortest 
time from inception to execution of a policy, one broker noted he had closed a deal in 
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three weeks.55 As such, private actors, particularly ones that need to operate on short 
timeframes, turn towards larger private insurers like ACE and AIG rather than appeal to 
the public sector.  
On the bank side as well, insurers have become better attuned to the limits that 
events such as the Tequila Crisis and Argentina devaluation had on perceptions about 
political risk insurance to help insure debt. More specifically, non-payment insurance 
offers a far more encompassing catchall against credit events than its previous form. 
Significantly, while more traditional insurance coverages grew naturally from OPIC and 
Eximbank offerings, it was actually the regulatory environment that changed the 
incentives for banks to seek capital relief through insurance means that fostered the 
growth of this insurance type. These new products offer the potential for far fewer denials 
of coverage (the loopholes that allowed insurers to not pay out from previous credit 
events), and as such require higher premiums. As one broker explains: “[underwriters] 
have needed to adapt and what [banks] want must include default full-stop.”56 From pure 
political risk to NPI then, the private insurance market has readily adopted not only 
OPIC’s private role, but showed great market responsiveness to market conditions. 
 
  
                                                 
55 Expert Interview. Stephen Kay (Marsh USA, Head of U.S. Political Risk Practice). 2/27/2015. 
56 Expert Interview. Stephen Kay (Marsh USA, Head of U.S. Political Risk Practice). 2/27/2015. 
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IV. FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES & CREDIT RISK 
A) Definition 
 
Financial hedging refers to strategies corporations use to reduce a company’s 
volatility or exposure to different risks. In this section, I provide a framework that 
explores the development of financial derivatives, how markets participants used such 
products historically, and the evolution of standards surrounding these financial tools. 
This research focuses on the changing nature of the financial system since the late 
twentieth century as banks and insurance companies increasingly “diversified their 
business away from the classic deposit-taking and lending function,” and began to 
“engage in other activities from which they earn fees in addition to net interest.”57 After a 
brief accounting of the breakdown of the financial system in 2008, I turn to how 
corporations currently use derivatives, and look at products that may be able to serve is 
proxies for companies that seek to reduce their political and credit exposure. Finally, I 
explore changes in the regulatory order that have begun to emerge since the passage of 
the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act to describe the current context of derivatives’ use.  
 A financial derivative is a “species of transactable contract in which:  
(1) “The change in the price of the underlying asset determines the value of the 
contract 
(2) The contract has some specified expiration date in the future”58 
 
                                                 
57 Malz, Allan M. Financial Risk Management: Models, History, and Institutions.  
58 LiPuma, 34.  
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The name “derivatives” arises from the notion that these products have no intrinsic value 
independent of the underlying asset; rather, the reference asset or “underlying” that the 
derivatives is based on creates its value. Today there exists a diverse array of derivative 
products that allow for companies to purchase or sell a hedge against some position, for 
example the value of a currency relative to another, or the probability that a government 
may default on its debt, with a counterparty.  
Credit risk refers to the measure of the uncertainty of future credit losses of a 
lender, due to a borrower’s delinquency on payments of contractual obligations or default 
on a loan.59 Empirically, credit risk results in the spread or difference between the credit-
risky entity and the risk-free interest rate, a premium known as the “credit spread.”60 As 
corporations deal with counterparties abroad to help finance investments and financial 
firms find themselves with exposure to sovereign debt and foreign corporate debt 
securities, strategies to reduce such credit risk have become more common.  In contrast 
then to the non-payment insurance, credit default swaps offer a capital-markets solution 
to credit risk. 
B) Case of Credit Default Swaps 
Through the use of credit default swaps, a company can purchase as hedge against 
default due to a credit event. A credit default swap is an instrument where a company 
pays another entity such as a bank a premium, where the initiator receives payment in the 
                                                 
59 Albanese, Claudio; Brigo, Damiano; and Frank Oerte. “Restructuring Counterparty Credit Risk.” 
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance (16, 2 (2013). Available here.  
60 Financial Risk Management. Page 191.  
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event of a credit event, usually a bankruptcy or default of some reference asset.61 Put 
differently, the buyer pays a protection seller a fixed fee each period (typically quarterly) 
in exchange for compensation should a default or credit event occur to a reference asset 
before the maturity of the CDS contract.62 This fee is usually a constant amount, 
expressed as a percentage of the notional amount of the total debt, remitted quarterly.63 
In part due to speculation - CDS do not require buyers to have a stake in the 
underlying asset - the CDS market grew quickly from a notional value of about $180 
billion in 1998 to a peak of $58 trillion in late 2007.64  Following the financial crisis, the 
use of CDS declined, to $21 trillion at the end of 2013, with a particular decrease in 
activity between banks.65 Out of necessity, corporations that use a CDS to hedge a 
position frequently employ a CDS referencing an underlying asset that is different from, 
but ideally closely correlated to, the loan position being hedged. Because the CDS 
operates within a capital market, in other words, then there must be a demand for that 
type of CDS contract, for instance with a sovereign debt or a large corporation’s debt 
issuance. To the extent that a hedge does not correlate perfectly with the actual risk that 
the corporation wishes to offset, there is higher basis risk. From CDS movements in 
recent elections, it appears banks use CDS’s as proxies for political risk on their debt 
                                                 
61 Jongho, Kim. “From Vanilla Swaps to Exotic Credit Derivatives: How to Approach the Interpretation of Credit 
Events.” Fordham University Corporate Law Journal (2008). 
62 Bhanot, Karan and Liiang Geo. “Types of Liquidity and Limits to Arbitrage—The Case of Credit Default Swaps.” 
Available through the University of Texas site, here. 
63 Yadav, Yesha. “Case for a Market in Debt Governance.” Vanderbilt Law Review (2014). Available through UT 
Library System here. 
64 Weistroffer, Christian. “Credit Default Swaps: Heading Towards a More Stable System.” Deutsche Bank Research 
(December 21, 2009). Available here. 
65 Monetary and Economic Department. “Statistical Release: OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-December 2013.” 
Bank for International Settlements (May 2014). Available here. 
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exposures.66 Thus the two most important distinctions between NPI and CDS are that NPI 
requires ownership of the asset in question, and thus has less basis risk.  
C) History of Derivatives 
I) GROWTH OF FORWARDS AND FUTURES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 A history of derivatives trading illustrates some of the contemporary rationales for 
CSD’ use, as well as the lack of readiness from a regulatory standpoint the public sector 
exhibited in the face of its large growth. Derivatives trading within the United States 
began principally to help hedge against commodity risks.  The most basic type, the 
forward contract, is an agreement between two parties to buy or sell an asset at a fixed 
price, for example an amount of grain, at a future period. The creation of the first 
exchange within the United States through the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1848 
facilitated such trading, and allowed farmers and merchants to come together to create 
standards for quantities and qualities of grains traded.67,68 Through forward contracts, 
farmers could hedge against fluctuations in prices, which previously saw seasonal peaks 
in the summer and troughs in the winter, through what became known as “to arrive” 
                                                 
66 “Political Risk Drives CDS.” Derivatives Week (4/23/2012). Available through UT Library via EBSCO 
Host here.  
67 Aran, Hemendra Aran & Alpesh Patel. Global Financial Markets Revolution: The Future of Exchanges 
and Global Capital Markets. Palgrave MacMillan Press (2006). Page 6.  
68 Forward contracts have a rich history well before the CBOT, dating back at least to the Italian merchant 
societies in Florence in the 13th and 14th centuries and English wool traders in the Middle Ages (Bell, 
2007).  
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contracts.69,70 In turn, merchants could lock in a price for future grain shipments rather 
than deal with these fluctuations.  
 In addition to forward contracts, a futures market also developed at exchanges. 
Futures allowed for greater flexibility in trading in gold, wheat, and pork. Futures and 
options allowed companies to “take deliberate (optimal) positions on future asset price 
movements and to sell off or take on the risks of price movements.”71 Futures offered 
similar trading activity as a forward contract, but because they could be traded throughout 
the life of the contract, offered a far more liquid means of doing so. Actors could come 
together to fulfill a “price discovery” function, where many participants tend to even out 
fluctuations. In other words: “Where a single flour miller or cotton spinner is in the 
market once, the speculator enters it hundreds or thousands of times, and his errors in 
judgement must show a correspondingly stronger tendency to cancel out and leave him a 
constant and predictable return on his operations.”72 Empirically, prices bear out how the 
advent of the CBOT reduced volatility from at least the 1870s onward once “grading” 
and “standardization” of goods occurred.73   
                                                 
69 Special Collections and University Archives, University of Illinois at Chicago. “Historical Note: 
Chicago Board of Trades Records.” Available here.  
70 Tickell, Adam. “Dangerous Derivatives: Controlling and Creating Risks in International Money.” 
Geoforum, Vol. 31, 1, (2002). Available here.  
71 Bryan, Dick & Michael Rafferty. “Financial Derivatives and the Theory of Money.” Economy and 
Society (2006). Available here.  
72 Knight, Frank. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. University of Chicago Press (1921). Page 256. 
73 Santos, Joseph. “Did Futures Markets Stabilize US Grain Prices?” Journal of Agricultural Economics 
(March 2002). Available here. Page 26 
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 The twentieth century would continue to see deepening of these futures markets 
across a range of different assets outside of agricultural commodities.74 However, it 
would not be until the end of the Bretton Woods System that the next cycle of financial 
innovations occurred, with a new role for derivatives in the financial system. Specifically, 
the Bretton Woods Conference in 1948 set a standard for the next two decades that 
standardized monetary policy around the world, pegging exchange rates to gold with the 
US dollar as the reserve currency. An adjustable pegging to the dollar, which in turn 
would pay out at a rate of $35 per ounce of gold, created a norm for international trade.  
However, macroeconomic conditions eventually became the Bretton Woods 
System’s undoing. For, if the dollar were the reserve currency, then should the United 
States begin to run large current-account deficits, its dollar convertibility at a fixed rate 
with gold would come into question. And such an effect is evident. Foreign governments 
were keen to accumulate dollar holdings for liquidity purposes after Bretton Woods’ 
inception; European governments had gold (as opposed to dollars) account for less than 
ten percent of US balance of payments before 1958. This relationship quickly reversed: 
between 1959 and 1968, nearly two-thirds of U.S. balance of payments was financed 
through reductions in U.S. gold reserves.75 Given this trend, something would have to 
give. By 1968 with a run on gold reserves, President Nixon put an end to US dollar-gold 
                                                 
74  This increase did include certain regulatory setbacks including the “Banning of Futures in 1936” as a 
response to speculation in the lead up to the Great Depression and the Chicago Onions Futures Act of 1958, 
which led to a “complete prohibition of onion futures trading order to assure the orderly flow of onions in 
interstate commerce,” notably the only time in U.S. history that Congress banned futures trading of any 
commodity (Jacks, 2007) 
75 Hall et al. “Bretton-Woods System, Old and New, and the Rotation of Exchange Rate Regimes.” 
Manchester School (March 2011). Available here. Page 298.   
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conversions that existed through gold pooling, and by 1973, the Bretton Woods System 
ended officially.76 
II) POST- BRETTON WOODS PERIOD 
Against a backdrop of newly flexible currency regimes, quickly there arose new 
challenges from floating rates wherein “inflation caused price instability in the foreign 
exchange markets and substantial relative price instability amongst industrialized 
countries suffering inflationary pressure but at different rates.”77 Amidst volatility 
between currencies came demands for derivative products that could arbitrate away 
currency and interest rate shifts. By 1972, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange created the 
International Money Market, which traded in currency futures, and several years later, 
introduced interest rate futures. The 1973 publication of “The Pricing of Options and 
Corporate Liability” by Fischer Black and Byron Scholes offered an option pricing model 
(commonly dubbed the “Black-Scholes formula”), helped to better approximate such 
futures’ use as hedges, further increasing this trend.  
Currency swaps allowed companies to protect against future changes in foreign 
currency prices. This financial instruments were first employed in an exchange between 
IBM and the World Bank in 1981. At the time the World Bank, which had already 
reached its borrowing limits with Switzerland and Germany, borrowed dollars in the U.S. 
markets and swapped this debt obligation with IBM in exchange for IBM’s existing franc 
                                                 
76 Hall et al. Page 299. 
77 Pryke, Michael & John Allen. “Monetized Time-Space: Derivatives – Money’s ‘New Imaginary’?” 
Economy and Society (December 2010). Available here.  
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and deutsche mark obligations.78 Such an exchange, mediated through Solomon Brothers, 
allowed for one entity, the World Bank, to circumvent capital controls, while IBM 
protected itself from interest rate risk (the United States interest rate was as high as 17% 
to combat high inflation). This trade demonstrated how currency swaps not only offer a 
means to hedge, or to offset potential losses through an accompanying investment, but 
also a means to circumvent regulatory standards in place. 
While growth in derivatives began primarily within exchanges, the 1980s saw the 
increased use of swaps and the rise of “over-the-counter” (OTC) derivatives. As one 
author describes:  
“Although over-the-counter options and forwards had previously existed, [the 
1980s] was the first decade with managers to come out of business schools with 
exposure to derivatives. Soon virtually every large corporation, and even some 
that were not so large, were using derivatives to hedge, and in some cases, 
speculate on interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity risk.”79  
 
Exchange-traded derivatives, as their name implies, are organized through a 
clearinghouse or exchange such as the London International Financial Futures Exchange 
(LIFFE) or the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and typically have “standard 
structures, require that money is placed with the exchange as a guarantee, and that extra 
margin payments have to be made against adverse market moves.” In contrast, OTC 
derivatives are typically “tailored products which have no protection from the exchanges 
and are held ‘off balance sheet.’”80 The skyrocketing of the use of derivatives, including 
                                                 
78 “Why Do Global Firms Use Currency Swaps? Theory and Evidence (October 2004). Available here.  
79 Ye, George. “A Brief History of Derivatives.” White Paper, Available here. From Don Chance’s “Essays 
in Derivatives  
80 Tickell, Adam. “Dangerous Derivatives: Controlling and Creating Risks in International Money.” 
Geoforum, Vol. 31, 1, (2002). Available here. Page 
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these more opaque OTC instruments, demonstrates how corporations turned to capital 
markets in the face of new structural challenges. 81  
This new growth for derivatives products did bring about some efforts towards 
harmonization of international finance. The Basel Accord on Capital Standards in 1987-
1988 (“Basel I”) was the first step on this track. One record refers to it as the 
“cornerstone of a new regulatory order.”82 In short, this meeting sought to foster “better 
supervision of internationally active banks in order to create a level playing field among 
different jurisdictions,” which until then had quite different regulatory standards.83 The 
Accord prescribed specific capital adequacy ratios based on the perceived risk of the 
bank’s different asset classes. More specifically, banks had to pass certain reserve 
requirements based on the riskiness of their assets. For example, the “value-at-risk” 
formula worked to find the “worst-case loss of a truncated historical distribution” of the 
value of a bank’s holdings.84 Such techniques, with clear limitations based on modeling 
assumptions, created an estimate to serve as a “reasonably accurate guide to the ‘main 
body’ risk of most portfolios.”85 These measures, however, did not apply directly to OTC 
derivative products, which were considered “off-balance sheet.” Even with more 
standards in place, derivatives continued to be outside the purview of regulatory reforms.  
                                                 
81 For an excellent distillation on the merits of OTC derivatives, refer to Daniel Marcus and Lievin 
Tshikali’s “Some Misconception about OTC Markets in Law and Financial Markets Review (2010), here.  
82 Adam Tickell. “Dangerous Derivatives: Controlling and Creating Risks in International Money.” 
Geoforum (February 2000). Available here. (who cites Kapstein) 
83 King, Michael R. & Timothy J. Sinclair. “Private Actors and Public Policy: a Requiem for the New Basil 
Accord.” International Political Science Review (July 2003). Available here. Page 349.  
84 Maymim, Phillip Z. & Zakhar G Maymin. “Any Regulation of Risk Increases Risk.” Financial Markets 
and Portfolio Management (Fall 2012). Available here. Page 301.  
85 Financial Risk Management. 93.  
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Derivatives trading showed its potential to create contagion to the broader 
economy with several high-profile collapses in the 1990s. The first in England from the 
century-old Barings Bank showed how a single trader was able to “evade both internal 
controls and external supervision in order to bring about a series of disastrous derivatives 
trades.”86 This incident led to the “Windsor Declaration”, a meeting of 16 regulatory 
bodies that recognized the contagion effect of a derivatives trade gone wrong as well as 
the need for harmonization.87 The demise of Long Term Capital Management, a 
prominent hedge fund in the mid-1990s, showed the contagion that the combined forces 
of leverage and derivatives could have on the broader market. From its inception in 1994 
to its bankruptcy in 1998, LTCM was regarded as one of the pioneers in derivatives 
trading, with a star-studded cast at its helm.  The leadership included “John Meriwether, 
who had been a bond trader at Salomon Brothers, and two finance-gurus, Myron Scholes 
and Robert C. Merton, who would both win Nobel Prize in 1997,” as well as David 
Mullins, a former governor of the Federal Reserve. 88 At its peak, LTCM had 
relationships with fifteen of “Wall Street’s biggest banks, leveraging $5 billion into more 
than $1 trillion in derivatives.”89 After its demise, one influential policymaker, Brooksley 
Born, recounted to the House Bank Committee in 1998: “This episode should serve as a 
wake-up call about the unknown risks that the over-the-counter derivatives market may 
                                                 
86 Tickell.  
87 U.S. Commodities and Futures Trading Commission. “International Publications: Windsor Declaration.” 
Available here.  
88 Barth, James R.; Caprio Jr., Gerard; and Ross Leving. Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work 
for Us. MIT Press (Cambridge, 2012). Page 95. 
89 Barth et al. Page 95. 
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pose to the US economy and to financial stability around the world.”90 As early as the 
1990s then, the trading complexity brought about through derivative shows its negative 
potential on the real economy. 
Changes to help contain such negative effects, however, did not materialize. 
Instead, by 1996 the Federal Reserve decided they would empower rather than constrain 
the use of derivatives, especially with respect to credit default swaps. Specifically, it 
allowed for banks to use credit default swaps to reduce a bank’s “owner-contributed 
equity capital.” In other words,  
“Regulators treated the securities guaranteed by an issue of the CDS as having the 
same risk level as the issuer (or, more accurately, the counterparty) of the CDS. 
Thus a bank that purchased credit default swap protection from AIG on 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) linked to subprime loans would have those 
CDOs treated as AAA securities, for capital regulatory purposes, because AIG 
had an AAA rating from …an SEC-approved (“blessed”) credit-rating agency.”91 
 
In this scenario, these regulating bodies effectively outsourced whether issuers of CDS 
were creditworthy to credit-ratings agencies who stood to earn a profit by doing so.92 Nor 
did the Fed create mechanisms to evaluate how a failure in the CDS market could 
cascade to other banks and institutions.  
Much of the coordination that did take place came through a private-sector body, 
the International Swaps & Derivatives Association (ISDA). For example, an area of 
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92 As one academic explains “The financial engineers of Wall Street  put a highly volatile synthetic 
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global banking system” (Lucarelli, Page 435).  
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dispute within the derivatives space was how to standardize a deal if settlement from a 
credit event occurred. Through the “CDS Protocol,” ISDA helped to create norms for 
such settlements of market orders in 2006.93 However, this trade association’s roles and 
incentives were never to create the proper safeguards to ensure stability the larger 
financial markets. 
Most immediately salient to the crisis was the role these credit derivatives played 
in allowing banks to change their risks profiles. Products such as credit default swaps 
have been associated with moral hazard in particular because they reduced incentives to 
monitor borrowers, and as a result fueled credit expansion.94 Particularly when certain 
firms such as Lehman Brothers combined CDS positions with enormous leverage, in the 
event of a credit crunch, these firms quickly became overly exposed. Due to the lack of 
transparency from OTC trading, this condition went unchallenged until there were a 
systemic event occurred in 2008.95 These interconnections between banks greatly 
exacerbated any fallout throughout the banking system.  
III) 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND BEYOND 
These challenges came to a head in 2008 with AIG, which at the time of the 
liquidity crunch had some $500 billion notional exposure in CDS protection. After 
marking-to market the amount it owed as a credit protection seller on a portfolio of MBS 
                                                 
93 Derivatives Week. “ISDA Finalizes CDS Protocol.” (September 18, 2006). Available here.  
94 Alnassar et al. “Credit Derivatives: Did They Exacerbate the 2007 Global Financial Crisis? AIG: Case 
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following the collapse of the real estate market, AIG’s capital reserves were reduced and, 
as a result, the company lost its AAA credit rating. Subsequent ratings downgrades 
triggered requirements to post tens of billions in dollars in collateral to AIG’s CDS 
counterparties. While AIG highly rated, their swap deals did not require them to hold 
collateral on their positions; however, once downgraded, there were collateral calls from 
these debt investors who purchased the swaps. As debtholder covenants triggered, these 
downgrades had cascading effects: when AIG fell from AA+ to A+, AIG was required to 
post approximately $10.5 billion in collateral calls.96  Because AIG could not provide this 
capital, rather than allow the insurer to fail, the U.S. government in late 2008 provided an 
emergency $85 billion loan to the company. In part because AIG’s large CDS positions 
were chiefly occurring over the OTC market, relevant parties were not aware of the 
insurer’s total exposure.97 By June of 2009, the total bailout funding available to AIG 
through different programs grew to more than $180 billion.98 As well, with non-
performing securitized products flush in the system, the Fed took the additional 
unprecedented step of taking these formerly AAA-rated securitized products onto its own 
books.  
In the wake of the financial crisis, the most immediate changes to the CDS market 
came principally from ISDA once more through the “Big Bang and Small Bang” 
                                                 
96 Son, Hugh. “AIG Ratings Cut by S&P, Moody’s, Threatening Fund Raising.” Bloomberg (September 
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97 Loon. Page 95.  
98 Stowell. Page 121.   
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Protocols of 2009.99 These steps work to further standardize protocols. The Big Bang 
Protocols created standard spreads, spread dates and the “hardwiring of credit event 
auctions.”100 Standard spreads and spread dates refer to the market maker of the CDS 
having fixed values for the quoted price of a CDS (for example 25 or 1,000 bps) whose 
CDS lasts for a certain number of years, say one or five years. While these spreads will 
vary based on market conditions, these standards at the inception reduced that upfront 
payments between buyers and sellers. The credit event auctions refer to a recognition of 
how, in the event of a CDS being triggered, there would be a norm for how the settlement 
would actually occur through a step-by-step auction process. These changes also led to 
greater adoption use of clearing and settlement organizations such as the Depository 
Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) and the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). While 
such changes did not have the force of law, these changes did impose some norms that 
would create greater stability in the use of such derivatives.  
Post-financial crisis legislative reforms came principally through the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), and led to 
increased scrutiny of credit derivatives. The 2,300 page legislation called for an 
overhauling of much of the status quo in the regulatory environment. Relevant to credit 
derivatives, Congress mandated the use of clearing houses to help locate and standardize 
transactions between different counterparties, rather than trade over-the-counter where 
                                                 
99 Griffin, Paul A. “The Market for Credit Default Swaps: New Insights into Investors’ Use of Accounting 
Information.” Accounting and Finance (20140. Available here. Page 860 
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possible. The Act empowered a number of different federal agencies, chiefly the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), to regulate derivatives. The new legislation sought to “police the 
derivatives market and force once-private transactions onto open exchanges, in full view 
of regulators.”101 The first change was the introduction of central clearing. Through 
central clearing, a “central counterparty” (CCP) acts as an intermediary, assuming the 
role of a buyer and seller, and guarantees “contractual fulfillment if either party 
defaults.”102 This situation helped to reduce counterparty risk, and also created 
multilateral netting, which allowed for different counterparties to offset positions. As one 
author explains, 
“Suppose that three dealers are members of a CCP such that dealer 1 has a $1 
million exposure to dealer 2 on a CDS, dealer 2 has a $2 million exposure to 
dealer 3 on the same CDS, and dealer 3 has a $1 million exposure to dealer 1 for 
the same CDS. Multilateral netting by a CCP means that only remaining exposure 
is dealer 2’s exposure to dealer 3 for a net amount of $1 million.”103 
 
Coming off the financial crisis, where certain companies had such large notional-value 
positions in CDS, the use of a CCP helped to bring light to such exposure. In other words, 
the use of CCPs helped to create transparency in the markets, to reduce off-setting 
positions, and to create liquidity. 
                                                 
101 Deborah Solomon. “Gensler’s Struggles Mark Regulatory Challenges.” Wall Street Journal (July 19, 
2011). Available here.  
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Rollout of Dodd-Frank, consistently faced hurdles to implementation after bill 
passage. For example, one year after President Obama signed the bill, regulating agencies 
had only created rules for 40 of 237 rules in the bill.104 Prohibitions on certain trading 
activities through specifically Wall Street lobbying in December 2014 led to the rolling 
back of rules for the $700 trillion derivatives market.105 More recently, a February 2015 
bill passed in the House with only 29 Democratic votes that would allow large banks to 
continue to trade swaps in divisions with government backstops (rather than silo these 
units). In other words, the jury remains out as to whether further reforms are actually in 
place with lines of authority to oversee and regulate derivatives market makers.  
 Financial innovations therefore have a long history within the United States, as 
new hedging strategies crop up amidst changes within the larger macroeconomic 
environment. Particularly relevant to the study of political and credit risks, these 
innovations appear to have grown without much direct oversight until the post-financial 
crisis period. With Dodd-Frank, several regulators including the SEC and CFTC now 
assumedly play roles to ensure that to the extent that derivatives exist, they increasingly 
occur within a more a transparent clearing house. Additionally, while Basel I largely 
excluded off-balance sheet items, perhaps with Basel III, regulators will be better armed 
to incorporate credit derivatives such as CDS within the risk calculations for the proper 
capitalization and solvency of banks. Indeed, that exchange-traded CDS remain a small 
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proportion of the overall CDS market suggests that efforts currently underway to bring 
transparency into this market face great institutional challenges. More broadly speaking, 
excluding expected changes Dodd-Frank implementation, this historical process 
highlights the lack of government intervention in the formation and subsequent regulation 
of derivatives within the marketplace. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
I) KEY TAKEAWAYS 
This treatment of political risk insurance, which grew organically through a 
public-sector agency until the private sector saw room for profits, contrasts starkly with 
the rapid proliferation of the credit derivative market. Insurance, as a cover for assets in 
volatile regions or for corporate or sovereign debt, continues to demand that the risk 
agent hold some reference to the underlying asset. In turn, the CDS market grew quickly 
out of a derivatives environment that practically from its founding allowed for market 
participation often without direct control over the underlying. So long as there might be a 
market for a buyer and a seller, either through an exchange or through a tailored contract, 
two parties could offset risks.  
There are of course meritorious purposes for both these insurance and finance 
tools. These “specialty” lines of insurance allow commercial underwriters to receive 
premiums in markets that likely have little correlation to their other large risk exposure 
(such as the general lines of Worker’s Compensation and Property/Casualty). From the 
purchaser’ vantage, typically through a broker, a company can guard against large losses 
that could be catastrophic to their businesses. In turn, banks are able to purchase such 
CDS’s as protection against a negative outcome of their debt exposure, freeing up capital 
for other investments.   
More broadly, the insurance history highlights how increasingly private-sector 
actors have come together to embrace what began as a public-sector solution to a market 
challenge. Structural changes in political risk insurance and credit insurance suggest that 
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public institutions such as OPIC and MIGA may continue to serve as the vanguard for 
political and trade-credit risk policies in the most politically volatile regions. The 
transition over OPIC’s use shows some flexibility as a government agency to help 
promote a foreign policy agenda depending on the needs of the Administration. Within 
the private sector as well, the sustains appetite among underwriters shows how these 
types insurance will likely become more commonplace as a risk management strategy, 
with adequate supply to meet a growing scope of political and credit risks. As one broker 
notes: “Now for most risks except at the margin that are not underwrite-able, privates can 
do almost anything.”106 Indeed, one specific PRI contract on the asset side has grown to 
insure more than $1.5 billion of a company’s facilities worldwide, with dozens of 
insurers coming together to serve as a first-line defense (and reduce a Fortune-50’s 
exposure). A recent project in Haiti, where OPIC insured the post-earthquake re-building 
of Seaboard Overseas Limited’s flour mill, which previously produced 95% of the 
country’s flour, demonstrates how public PRI can work alongside private PRI without 
direct competition.107 Additionally, the continued existence of OPIC and Eximbank, with 
growing balance sheets, suggests these institutions continue to operate beyond the goals 
that were set forth in their immediate charter, as for example OPIC moves more directly 
to support infrastructure-based investment funds rather than PRI-only.  
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In the financial space as well, new products including credit default swaps offer 
companies a different path to insure against delinquency and other credit events. From 
the first transactions at the Chicago Board of Trade, new innovations in finance allowed 
for new forms of risk-taking and risk mitigation. Changes in the marketplace after the 
collapse of the Bretton-Woods system saw corporations appeal to capital-markets 
solutions to hedge against a range of risks outside their core business function. 
Specifically related to credit default swaps, these instruments great liquidity to the 
system. While there is an observable credit spread for sovereign and corporate bonds, 
there is often little trading in these assets, where investors will hold the bonds for quite a 
long time, or until maturity. An active CDS market allows for bondholders to hedge 
without having to give up the bond; conversely, the protection seller gets a means to 
place a bet on the intuition that the bond will perform well, thus a potential for profits. 
Even if there were liquidity in these credit markets, the transaction costs of buying and 
selling, rather than doing so on a CDS market, may be quite high. A history of derivatives 
suggests that regulatory innovation and oversight did not keep pace with these new 
instruments. When the stakes are arguably much higher because of the role of 
speculation, allowing for much more betting to take place, these tools clearly led to 
mismanagement in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis.  
 The fallout, however, from the over-extended position of AIG, as well as the false 
sense of security CDS protection engendered showed the drawbacks of such trading. The 
government’s need to effectively bail out AIG, and the Federal Reserve holding trillions 
of dollars of CDS-guaranteed ABS and MBS on its balance sheet demonstrate how the 
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taxpayer has been left holding the bag even as profits from these securitizations and 
premiums have long since been rewarded. Improvements in market efficiency from more 
historical derivatives such as traded on the CBOT through price discovery are less 
evident for this synthetic market, where more actors are hedge funds betting on certain 
credit outcomes. In contrast, the insurance fallout from the Tequila Crisis, while showing 
at the time the limits of such coverage, did not extend beyond the industry. And, based on 
input from would-be insured companies, providers have re-tailored existing packages to 
deal with these previous flaws. The absence of government regulation to determine 
outcomes in either crisis is telling.  
 From the insurance vantage, regulation continues to exist primarily at the 
individual state-level through state agencies. The basis for such regulation, predicated on 
the McCarren-Ferguson Act of 1945 has seen little regulatory change. While Dodd-Frank 
Act did create a Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within Treasury, it remains to be seen 
how this addition will truly change the environment. In contrast, derivatives have seen 
sweeping change intended to bring greater transparency to the marketplace. Perhaps only 
the future will tell how these reforms for derivatives such as CDS can continue to serve a 
risk mitigation function at the corporate level (and in so doing foster growth and trade), 
without instilling fragility into the broader financial system.  
II) NEXT ROUND OF RESEARCH 
An additional area for exploration is to extend this convergence in the credit space 
(between Credit Default Swaps and Non-Payment Insurance) to a new political risk 
derivative product that aligns with more traditional PRI policies. Put differently, could a 
 54 
corollary arise within the derivatives space that hedges against certain political risks? One 
argument against the arrival of such a product is that political risks do not have direct 
underlying assets from which a liquid market could develop. For example, a mature 
company such as GE has a long track record of holding short and long-term debt from 
which market makers could create a credit default swap. Such conditions do not exist for 
political risk claims.  However, there are examples in financial derivatives where unlike 
in CDS’ relation to debt, there is no actual underlying. For example, one cannot have 
ownership of weather events. And yet, disaster-related catastrophe bonds exist, as do a 
range of (admittedly illiquid) weather derivatives.  
While there was a brief moment in the late 1990s when banks attempted to issues 
political risk derivatives, this market has clearly not taken off. In discussing why, one 
expert describes the “pendulum” of financial innovations, where perhaps as a result of the 
financial crisis, there is less demand for new, complex financial products. This paper then 
shows that corporations will continue to increase investments in politically volatile 
regions, and explore risk transfer strategies as they do so. While the analysis of the 
derivatives market showed that the regulatory environment may not be in place to truly 
prevent future systemic challenges, there could still be room for new financial 
innovations based on investors’ appetites.  
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